

TOPAHONEYCHAINS Trustable and Sustainable Open Platform for Smart Honey Value Chains EST. 2023

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This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no 862665 ERA-NET ICT-AGRI-FOOD.



Outline

- About the project
- Digital open data platform
 - Concepts
 - Challenges
- Fraudulent honey market modelling
 - $\circ \qquad \text{Game theory approach} \qquad \\$
- Conclusions

!!! Spoiler alert !!!

• Many unanswered questions ahead

Fraudulent honey problem

- 46% of honey on the European market is suspected of being adulterated
 - <u>https://agrinfo.eu/book-of-reports/46-of-honey-on-the-european-market-is-suspected-of-being-adulterated/</u>
 - o **2023**
- Honey labelling: deal with Council on measures to combat fraud
 - <u>https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240129IPR17211/honey-labelling-deal</u> <u>-with-council-on-measures-to-combat-fraud</u>
 - o **2024**
- A Sticky Situation: Fraudulent Honey in the EU
 - <u>https://www.iiea.com/publications/a-sticky-situation-fraudulent-honey-in-the-eu</u>
 - · 2024
- New test: Supermarket honey is not real
 - <u>https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/wissen/honig-supermarkt-gepanscht-dna-analyse-100.html</u>
 - o **2024**

The project

- Sustainability challenges
 - complex relations from farm to fork
 - climate change
 - increasing competitive pressures
 - food safety
- Higher value honey products
 - ensuring quality of honey
 - counteracting honey fraud
 - traceability
- Open data platform
 - innovative digital services
 - trustable, sustainable and adaptive solution




Trustable and Sustainable Open Platform for Smart Honey Value Chains EST. 2023

TOP4HONEYCHAINS


- Turkey
 - Kadir Has University, Coordinator
 - Işik University
 - Apiculture Research Institute, Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
- Poland
 - University of Economics in Katowice
- Argentina
 - Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia Agropecuaria
 - Nexco S.A
 - Cooperativa Agropecuaria Y Apicola Norte Grande Limitada
 - Alimentos Naturales Natural Foods S. A.
- Latvia
 - Latvia University of Life Sciences and Technologies

Honey value chain: a concept

- Information about whole product lifecycle
 - from apiary to table
- Directed graph of records
 - beekeeping practices
 - honey processing peculiarities
 - packaging details
 - sourcing from "external" providers
 - etc.
- Trustable and transparent platform
 - publicly available
 - validated and maintained



Honey value chain: use-cases




Honey value chain: entities

Production

apiary

harvest

practices



Honey value chain: an example



- Torben Pajari
 - Harvested lime honey near Littshalfield
- Gerhild Kühnel
 - Harvested buckwheat honey near Nabnewstu
- Beewater, GmbH
 - Sourced mixed honey from Asian region
- Ridgeco & Co
 - Blended batch as Mixed honey
 - Sold in bulk as Mixed honey
- Honeydustries
 - Packaged in 250g jars
- Lokilutions, SIA
 - Distributed at Corespace market


Challenges

- Benefits for main participants
- Validated information
- Link digital tools with physical products



Semi-centralized approach

- Few trusted authorities
- Authorize participants
- Verify records
- Handle disputes
- etc.



- Real-world examples
 - Card payments (VISA, Mastercard)
 - Internet certificate authorities (Let's Encrypt, GlobalSign)
 - General authentication providers (Smart-ID)
 - Government (digital signatures)

- Unclear business case for authorities
 - \circ how to earn money?
- Dispute handling is non-trivial
 - especially on international level
 - politics
- Differences between communities
 - quality expectations
 - biased opinions

Decentralized approach


- Blockchain
- Distributed ledger
- Peer-to-peer protocol
- All participants are "trusted" equally

- Maintenance
 - changes / fixes are impossible
 - ever growing ledger size
- Community involvement
 - peer-to-peer
 - unclear benefits
- Consensus mechanisms
 - proof-of-work (mining)



Community approach

- Let the community evolve naturally
- Voluntary activities
- Eventually reach "consensus truth"
- Similar to Open Source Software or Wikipedia



- Hard to achieve objective truth
 - opinions, influencers, marketing, paid reviews
 - information bubbles
- Current situation "de facto"
 - large producers maintain own communities
 - closed data platforms
 - only some information is published
 - no means to verify records

Digital tools vs Physical products

- **Digital tools**
 - convenience for users 0
 - time-proven security measures 0
 - easy verification 0
- Physical products
 - subject to environmental effects 0
 - no inherent verification means 0
 - easy tampering 0
- How to ensure digital records match products?
 - authorities \bigcirc
 - regulations 0
 - expensive verification Ο
- Organizational challenge rather than IT



Game theory and honey fraud modelling (WIP)

- Game theory
 - mathematical models
 - strategic interactions
 - social sciences, economics, laws, politics, international affairs, military, etc.
- Game
 - process with two or more involved sides
- Player
 - game participant
 - o aims to realize its own interests
- Strategy
 - player's course of action
 - best outcomes
 - depends on behaviour of other players

Combating Online Counterfeits: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cyber Supply Chain Ecosystem


Conference paper | First Online: 22 December 2020

pp 326-345

Zhao, Y., Zhu, Q. (2020). Combating Online Counterfeits: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cyber Supply Chain Ecosystem. In: Zhu, Q., Baras, J.S., Poovendran, R., Chen, J. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12513. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64793-3_18


Game schematic

- Markets
 - Non-deceptive adulterated products
 - "Jars of syrup"
 - Genuine and deceptive adulterated products
 - "Jars of honey"
 - "Look-alike jars of honey"
- Sellers
 - Fraudulent sellers try to sell adulterated products with various levels of deceptiveness
 - Genuine seller tries to sell genuine products
- Consumer
 - Chooses "most-valued" option among offers




Consumer model

- Product valuation
 - how important is product authenticity?
 - how easy is to deceive (vigilance)?
- Actions
 - buy nothing
 - zero utility
 - \circ buy adulterated product
 - utility depends on product valuation and its price
 - try to buy genuine product
 - utility depends on product valuation, its price and probability of being deceived
- Strategy
 - select action with highest utility




Market price model

- Genuine market price
 - amount of products on market
 - adulterated and genuine
- Adulterated market price
 - amount of products on market
 - genuine market price
 - price-following strategy
- Market share
 - proportion of consumers choosing each market



Seller models

- Non-deceptive seller
 - market share and price
 - low production costs
- Genuine seller
 - market share and price
 - high production costs
 - amount of adulterated products
- Deceptive seller
 - market share and price
 - medium production costs
 - amount of genuine products
 - probability and amount of penalty
- Strategy
 - select amount of products to produce
 - impacts product price
 - maximize profit




The games

• Stackelberg Game

- "leader-follower game"
- sellers influence prices by choosing their production volumes
- consumer observes offered prices and selects an action with highest utility


Nash Game

- competition among sellers
- equilibrium: no player can gain by changing own strategy
- Iterative simulation
 - initial values and parameters
 - converges to stable equilibrium




Simulation results


- Adulterated market is not a problem
 - consumers can be attracted to genuine market by lowering prices
 - increasing amount of genuine products
- Deceptive products on genuine market are severe threat
 - o affect market share
 - less differences between markets
- Non-deceptive seller's best strategy
 - lower prices to attract some consumers
- Deceptive seller's best strategy
 - saturate market with deceptive products
 - benefit from lower production costs
- Genuine seller's best strategy
 - lower price to attract consumers
 - lower production to balance higher production costs (market saturation)



Conclusions

- "Educate" consumers
 - reduce tolerance for adulterated products
 - increase vigilance
- Force high prices on adulterated products
 - attract more genuine sellers
 - weaken fraudulent sellers' impact on price making
- Improve penalizing mechanisms
 - suppress deceptive products
 - quality standards
 - product lifetime traceability





- Sales
- Production costs
- Penalty

Thanks for your attention!

Questions?